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CASE COMMENTS
longer be barred where it is alleged that the employer breached some
duty to the third party which in turn primarily caused injury to the
employee. Actions for contribution, however, would still be barred
under the Wiener theory, unless it be found that a special rule of law
took precedence, as was the case in Weyerhaeuser.
By permitting the case to be heard on the merits, Bremen offers the
most equitable solution to the problem. The third party has the oppor-
tunity to prove the duty owed to it by the employer and that the
breach of this duty was the main cause of the accident. If these factors
can be proved, the Government should hear the blame, for if the
United States can escape liability altogether in this situation, the third
party has no way to protect himself.5 0 At the same time, however, the
Government is not placed at an unreasonable disadvantage, for if the
third party cannot prove these factors, the United States will bear no
liability.
JoHN H. WEr, III
THE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY INCOME TAX ACT OF
1959: TAX-EXEMPT INTERCORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS IN
CONSOLIDATED FILING
The Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 19591 provides
for the determination of a final tax base to which ordinary corporate
rates of taxation are applied. Section 804 divides every item of invest-
ment yield into a policyholders' share and a company's share. The
policyholders' share is used to meet statutory reserve requirements,
2
the reserve being the amount the state requires that life insurance com-
panies set aside to provide for policyholders' claims against the com-
pany. The company's share is simply the remainder of investment
yield, which is available to the company for operating expenses and for
distribution or retention as profit. Section 804 provides that the policy-
holders' share is not to be included in taxable investment income. The
company's share of each item of investment yield, reduced by the com-
rlThis is most vividly illustrated in Bremen where the shipowner, by law, had
to submit to the inspection and thus apparently had no choice as to whether or
not he would allow the allegedly disabled inspector to board his ship.
'Pub. L. No. 86-69, § 2, 73 Stat. 112, amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch.
736, §§ 8oi-13, 68A Stat. 258; hereinafter referred to as the 1959 Act.
2See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-25 (1958), N.Y. INS. LAw § 72 (McKinney
1966), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-79 (Cum. Supp. 1967), VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-170 (Cum.
Supp. 1968).
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pany's share of certain specified items of tax-exempt income,3 con-
stitutes the company's taxable investment income.4
The formula of taxation provided by section 804 can best be ex-
plained by an example. Company X has total investment assets of
$1o'o,ooo,ooo of which $8o,ooo,ooo is held in reserves to meet policy-
holders' claims as is required by state statute. From total investment
assets company X receives $5,000,000 gross investment income. A de-
duction of $i,oooooo is then allowed for investment expenses and de-
preciation to arrive at an investment yield of $4,o6o,ooo.6 Assume that
the section 804 formula, in this instance, allows a policyholders' share
of 75%; then that percentage of every item of investment yield is not
included in the company's taxable investment income. The remain-
ing 25% constitutes the company's share. This is reduced by the com-
pany's portion of certain specified items of tax-exempt income6 to ar-
rive at the company's taxable investment income.
The recent case of Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. United
States7 involved the question of how the dividends from Pilot Life In-
surance Company, a wholly owned subsidiary filing on a consolidated
basis with Jefferson Standard, should be eliminated in computing tax-
able investment income. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 5 o2-3 1(b) (1) (i) (1955) pro-
vides only that these dividends are to be "eliminated" from taxable
income. Neither the Regulation nor the Code specifies where or how
they are to be eliminated, or, more specifically, at what stage of the
section 804 computations the elimination is to be made. In the years in
question, 1958 and 1959, dividends from the subsidiary, Pilot Life, were
eliminated from gross income in arriving at investment yields The dis-
'INT. Ray. CODE of 1954, § 8o4(a)(2) eliminates from taxable investment income
the company's share of interest from governmental obligations under Section 1o3;
partially tax-exempt interest under Section 242; and dividends received under
Sections 243-45.
'Section 8o2(b) of the 1959 Act provides the formula for determining life
insurance company taxable income and involves three phases of computations.
Phase one determines taxable investment income. Phase two is devoted to determin-
ing gain or loss from operations. Phase three determines the amount substracted
from policyholder's surplus accounts. See generally Pub. L. No. 86-69, § 2, 73
Stat. 112 as amended INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 801-20. Because the problem of
intercorporate distributions and tax exemption is dealt with more clearly and
directly in phase one, this discussion will be solely concerned with that phase.
5
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 804(c). Hereinafter INT. REV. CODE Of 1954 is re-
ferred to in text as the Code.
ONote 3 supra.
74o8 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1969), petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S.
June 17, 1969) (No. 15o6).
"The Pilot Life dividend was eliminated when the investment yields of the
two separate companies were combined. "Consolidated filing" might imply that
all the figures for both the companies are combined and that each item of income
[Vol. XXVII
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trict court approved Jefferson Standard's treatment of the consolidated
returns and the elimination of the Pilot dividend, thereby insuring the
full tax-exemption of such income.9 The Fourth Circuit reversed, up-
holding the government's claim that tax-exempt intercorporate distri-
butions should be treated the same as other exempt income under sec-
tion 804.10 That is, it should be included in investment yield for all
computations and divided into a policyholders' share and a company's
share. As a result the only dividends rendered non-taxable by con-
solidated filing are those in the company's share. The immunity does
not extend to the policyholders' share which is otherwise non-taxable.
The full intercorporate distribution is included in the section 804
computations which determine the shares. The ultimate effect of this
inclusion is to increase the company's percentage share of every item of
and deduction is computed on a combined basis. Instead, actual consolidation is
limited to certain specified items of income and deduction which after separate
computation are aggregated for both companies. See 8A J. MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INcoAm TAXATION § 46.O1 (1964). See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-30
to -31 (1955).
"Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 97
(M.D.N.C. 1967).
1'The result is that under the Fourth Circuit formula a life insurance com-
pany's taxable investment income is greater than under the district court formula.
The following merely illustrates the result and are not the actual figures.
District Court Fourth Circut
Basic Assumptions:
Investment assets Soo,ooo,ooo $1oo,ooo,ooo
Life insurance reserves 8o,ooo,ooo 8o,ooo,ooo
Assumed interest rate 3% 3%
Income Assumptions:
Gross income 5,2oo,oo0 5,200,000
less investment expenses & depreciation 1,200,000 1,200,000
less intercorporate distributions 200,000 (not eliminated)
TOTAL INVESTMENT YIELD S 3,800,ooo $ 4,000,000
Adjusted Reserves Rate 3.8% 4.0%
Adjusted Reserves 73,600,000 72,000,000
[life insurance reserves + (io x assumed interest rate) - (io x adjusted reserves rate)]
Policyholder's Percentage Share 73.% 72-0%
[(adjusted reserves x adjusted reserves rate) divided by investment yield]
Reserve Deduction (Policyholder's share) 2,796,8oo 2,880,000
Company's Percentage Share 26.4% 28.0%
Company's Share of Investment Yield $ 1,003,200 $ 1,120,000
less Company's Share of
Intercorporate Distributions - 56,000
•rAXABALE INVESTMENT INCOME $ 1,003,200 $ 1,064,000
Assumptions: current earnings rate equals adjusted reserves rate; pension
reserves, other dividends received, and interest paid equal zero.
Figures taken from Kaufman, The Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act
of 1959, 16 NAT'L TAx. J. 337, 348 (1963).
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investment yield, thereby increasing the amount of taxable invest-
ment income. 1
The question of tax-exempt income and the federal income tax on
life insurance companies was first raised in the 1928 case of National
Life Insurance Co. v. United States.12 There the Supreme Court held
invalid certain provisions of the Revenue Act of 1921'3 which not
only required a company with tax-exempt interest to pay as much in-
come tax as a company having no exempt interest but also subjected
the company with tax-exempt interest to pay more tax per dollar on
taxable income before deduction for the reserve. 14 This was, in effect,
a penalty for receiving tax-exempt income from government obliga-
tions. The Supreme Court stated that "[o]ne may not be subjected to
greater burdens upon his taxable property solely because he owns some
that is free."'15
The rule of National Life was extended in Missouri ex rel. Missouri
Insurance Co. v. Gehner'6 which involved the problem of a state prop-
erty tax on certain insurance companies.' 7 The state court interpreted
the statute as requiring that the allowable reserve deduction be re-
"Id.
2277 U.S. 508 (1928).
"Ch. 136, § 245, 42 Stat. 261.
"T-he 1921 Act taxed only investment income. Insurance companies were al-
lowed to exclude interest from government obligations from their gross income.
The deduction from investment income for reserve requirements was set at 4%
of the total amount in the reserve fund. However, they were required to subtract
from this reserve deduction the amount of the exclusion they had taken for tax-
free interest. So that, if two identical companies start with the same amount
of gross income, yet company A received tax-exempt interest, company A's tax-
able income before the reserve deduction is smaller (gross income less exempt
interest) than company B's. However, company A must reduce its reserve deduc-
tion by the amount of the exclusion for exempt interest. Thus, after the reserve
deductions are taken, they each have the same amount of taxable income. Since
the recipient of tax-exempt interest had a smaller amount of taxable income, after
the exempt interest exclusion but before the reserve deduction, the Supreme Court
held it was being subjected to greater burdens because of the receipt of such in-
terest. 277 U.S. 508.
1Id. at 519.
"281 U.S. 313 (1930).
2"The statute provided:
The property of all insurance companies organized under the laws of this
state shall be subject to taxation .... Every such company or association
shall make returns, subject to the provisions of said laws: First, of all the
real estate held or controlled by it; second, of the net value of all its other
assets or values in excess of the legally required reserve necessary to rein-
sure its outstanding risks and of any unpaid policy claims, which net
values shall be assessed and taxed as the property of individuals ....
Mo. REV. STAT. § 6386 (1919) as quoted in Missouri ex rel Missouri Insurance Co.
v. Gehner, 28i U.S. 313, 317-18 (1930).
[Vol. XXVII
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duced by the proportion which the value of United States bonds bore
to the total assets.' 8 The Supreme Court reversed and invalidated the
statute, holding that
[W]here as in this case the ownership of United States bonds
is made the basis of denying the full exemption which is accord-
ed to those who own no such bonds this amounts to an infringe-
ment of the guaranteed freedom from taxation.19
Thus, the doctrine of National Life that "one may not be subjected to
greater burdens" 20 because of ownership of government obligations was
extended in Gehner to mean that the value of government bonds must
be wholly disregarded in estimating net taxable values.21
The reasoning of Gehner was impliedly repudiated a year later in
Denman v. Slayton.22 There, the taxpayer, engaged in the business of
buying and selling municipal bonds, sought to have declared uncon-
stitutional the sections of the Revenue Act of 1923L23 which denied
deductions for interest on money borrowed to purchase or carry tax-
exempt securities. The Supreme Court held that the circumstances pre-
sented were different from those in National Life and that the tax-
payer was "not in effect required to pay more upon his taxable receipts
than was demanded of others who enjoyed like incomes solely because
he was the recipient of interest from tax-free securities .... -24 The
court declared that "[w]hile guaranteed exemptions must be strictly
observed, this obligation is not inconsistent with reasonable classifica-
19322 Mo. 339, 15 S.W.2d 334 (1929).
"281 U.S. at 321-22.
2'277 U.S. at 519.
2 Since there is no constitutional requirement that the state allow a reserve
deduction, Justice Stone reasoned in dissent that:
Calling the deduction.. .an "exemption" and saying that the ownership
of tax exempt securities is made the basis of denying the "full exemption,"
may give this case a verbal resemblence to [National Life] but it does no
more. True, a change by appellant from taxable to tax free investments
would result in a smaller deduction from its taxable assets, but it would
also result in a proportionate reduction of its taxable assets with a cor-
responding decrease in taxable values, always in exact proportion of appel-
lant's investment in tax exempt securities.
Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313, 330 (193)o (dissenting
opinion).
2'282 US. 514 (1931).
uSection 214(a) provides:
that in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: ...
(2) All interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness,
except on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry obliga-
tions or securities ... the interest upon which is wholly exempt from
taxation under this title ....
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 239.
'1282 U.S. at 519.
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tion designed to subject all to the payment of their just share of a bur-
den fairly imposed."2 5 While Gehner was not referred to, it was re-
jected by implication since the taxpayer was not allowed the full, un-
diminished exemption for tax-free income. In Denman the exemption
was decreased, in effect, by the amount of interest on obligations in-
curred to purchase and carry tax-exempt assets.
The Supreme Court in Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance
Co.26 followed Denman and again distinguished National Life without
mentioning Gehner. In Independent Life, the Court ruled con-
stitutional the sections of the Revenue Acts of 192 27 and i92428
which permitted deductions for depreciation and expenses of
buildings owned by life insurance companies only if the companies
included in their gross incomes the rental value of the space they oc-
cupied. Under the Denman rule this formula was held to be a valid
apportionment of expenses between the space occupied by the com-
pany and the space for which rents were received. The sections were
held to be constitutional since they did not lay a direct tax on the
rental value of space occupied by the companies, which had been held
previously not to be income within the meaning of the sixteenth
amendment.29
The problem of tax-exempt income under the 1959 Act had been
dealt with previously in United States v. Atlas Life Insurance Co.,30
which specifically concerned the exemption of income from municipal
bonds. The Atlas decision held that the formula of the 1959 Act for
determining taxable investment income did not place an impermissible
tax on tax-exempt interest from municipal bonds. The Court, inter-
preting Denman and Independent Life to mean that "tax laws may
require tax-exempt income to pay its way,"3 1 held that there was no
basis for the contention that the policyholder reserve must be satisfied
by resort to taxable income alone. The reasons given were that policy-
holder claims run against all income, taxable or not, and tax-exempt
income is not exempt from the company's obligation to add a large por-
tion of investment income to the policyholder reserve.3 2 The Court
251d.
"292 U.S. 371 (1934).
- Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 245(b), 42 Stat. 261.
2Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 24 5 (b), 43 Stat. 289.
29Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (192o); cf. Stratton's Independence v.
Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913).




noted that the insurance company's insistence on excluding both the
full and reserve and tax-exempt income was
tantamount to saying that those who purchase exempt securi-
ties... are constitutionally entitled to reduce their tax liability
and to pay less per taxable dollar than those owning no such
securities. The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity does
not require such a benefit to be conferred on the ownership of
municipal bonds. 33
In the instant case, Jefferson Standard and its subsidiary filed con-
solidated returns in 1958 and 1959. The filing of consolidated returns
is not a right but a privilege which exists at the discretion of Congress34
and results in the availability of substantial tax savings to the tax-
payer.35 This privilege is given on the condition that all members of
the affiliated group "consent to all the consolidated return regulations
prescribed under section 1502 prior to the last day prescribed by law
for the filing of such return." 36 Furthermore, the Regulation 37 permit-
ting the exemption of intercorporate distributions in consolidated fil-
ing is subject to the general reservation of Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-3 that
whenever a problem arises in consolidated filing that is not covered
by the Regulations, the matter should be determined in accordance
with the provisions of the Code or other applicable law.38 The court
in Jefferson Standard remarked that "[m]anifestly this reservation
should be given wider latitude where, as here, the Regulation pre-
ceded the Act and the Act made fundamental changes in the mode of
taxing life insurance companies." 39
The privilege of making consolidated returns and thereby receiving
the exemption on intercorporate distributions is predicated solely on
legislative grace, and the taxpayer making consolidated returns is made
expressly subject to the Regulations and the provisions of the Code
or other applicable law. It does not appear that the exemption on in-
Mid. at 251.
"INT. R a. CODE of 1954, § 1501. 8A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 46.01 (1964); see Smith Paper Co. v. Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 28 (1934),
affd sub nom. Export Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Comm'r, 78 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1935).
2See Crestol, Consolidated Return Regulations and Related Tax Provisions,
N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED. TAx 731 (1968).
nINT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1501.
37Treas. Reg. § i.15o2-3 1(b)(1)(i) (1955).
3nThe Regulation provides:
a]ny matter in the determination of which the provisions of the regula-
tions ... are not applicable shall be determined in accordance with the
provisions of the Code or other law applicable thereto.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-3 (1955).
304o8 F.2d at 846 n.6.
197o01
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come from municipal obligations, grounded in constitutional law
40
and specifically provided for in the Code,41 is any lesser right. There-
fore, the reliance on Atlas seems well founded. If the full exemption is
not granted for income from municipal bonds under 'the 1959 Act,
there seems no logical reason why it should be granted for intercorpor-
ate distributions in consolidated filing. In addition, the general re-
servation that a problem not covered by the Regulations should be
resolved in accordance with the Code and law applicable thereto is
satisfied by relying on Atlas and the section 804 treatment of other
forms of tax-exempt income.
The court in Jefferson Standard rejected the taxpayer's elimina-
tion of intercorporate distributions at the outset of section 8o4 com-
putations on the reasoning, presented in Atlas, that a portion of the
intercorporate distribution belongs to the policyholder's share. The
court said,
If Pilot's dividend to taxpayer is to be eliminated at the outset
of the ... computations, in effect, the Act would be construed as
if liabilities to taxpayer's policyholders were to be satisfied solely
by other income.... [B]oth taxpayer's investment in Pilot and
the income derived therefrom are available and legally liable for
the satisfaction of taxpayer's liabilities to its policyholders. 42
This reasoning is in accord with the language in Atlas that "the tax
laws may require tax-exempt income to pay its way." 43 Thus, the tax-
exempt character of the income is not recognized at the outset of the
computation, but is recognized at its conclusion, when the life insur-
ance company's share of investment income is determined.
Looking behind Atlas to the rule in National Life, it is evident that
the formula of the 1959 Act as applied in the instant case does not
subject Jefferson Standard to "greater burdens" because it is the recipi-
ent of tax-exempt income. Although Jefferson Standard is not accorded
the benefit of both the full exclusion of intercorporate distributions
and the full reserve deduction, the receipt of such tax-exempt income
does result in a lower total tax. The full portion of intercorporate dis-
tribution relegated to the company's share is eliminated before the tax
is applied, thereby lowering the total tax.
'°Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) held income from
state and municipal obligations constitutionally immune from federal taxation.
There is controversy as to whether this case still represents valid constitutional
doctrine. Cf. Powell, The Waning of Inter-governmental Tax Immunities, 58
HARv. L. REv. 633 (1945); Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Im-
munities, 58 HARV. L. REv. 757 (1945).
41INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 1o5(a)(i).
424o8 F.2d at 846-47.
13381 U.S. at 247.
